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Abstract
Background: Several biomedical ontologies cover the domain of biological functions, including molecular and cellular 
functions. However, there is currently no publicly available ontology of anatomical functions.
Consequently, no explicit relation between anatomical structures and their functions is expressed in the anatomy
ontologies that are available for various species. Such an explicit relation between anatomical structures and their
functions would be useful both for defining the classes of the anatomy and the phenotype ontologies accurately.
Results: We provide an ontological analysis of functions and functional abnormalities. From this analysis, we derive an 
approach to the automatic extraction of anatomical functions from existing ontologies which uses a combination of 
natural language processing, graph-based analysis of the ontologies and formal inferences. Additionally, we introduce 
a new relation to link material objects to processes that realize the function of these objects. This relation is introduced 
to avoid a needless duplication of processes already covered by the Gene Ontology in a new ontology of anatomical 
functions.
Conclusions: Ontological considerations on the nature of functional abnormalities and their representation in current 
phenotype ontologies show that we can extract a skeleton for an ontology of anatomical functions by using a 
combination of process, phenotype and anatomy ontologies automatically. We identify several limitations of the 
current ontologies that still need to be addressed to ensure a consistent and complete representation of anatomical 
functions and their abnormalities.
Availability: The source code and results of our analysis are available at http://bioonto.de.
Background
The notion of function is important throughout biology.
I t  i s  u s e d  t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  b i o l o g i c a l  s e q u e n c e s  [ 1 ] ,  c e l l
types [2], anatomical structures [3] and to annotate gene
products [4]. Functions are also used in the description of
phenotypes of functionings, i.e., observable phenomena
regarding the functioning or malfunctioning of biological
entities. These phenotypes play an important role in the
discovery of gene functions and in the description of
abnormalities, diseases, signs and symptoms.
Phenotype ontologies
We define a phenotype as any observable characteristic of
an organism, part of an organism or process in which an
organism or one of its parts is involved. Phenotypes may
include both structural and behavioral properties. Func-
tional phenotypes are either observable characteristics of
a process that realizes a function of an organism or a part
of the organism, or properties of an organism that involve
its functions (such as having a function or lacking a func-
tion).
Phenotype ontologies for mouse and human pheno-
types were developed to annotate research databases of
mouse and human phenotypes. The Mammalian Pheno-
type Ontology (MPO) focuses on mutant mouse pheno-
types [5] and the Human Phenotype Ontology (HPO)
focuses on Mendelian diseases in man [6]. They make an
explicit reference to anatomy ontologies in their cross-
product definitions [7], and implicit reference to the anat-
omy ontologies in the naming of their categories.
The HPO uses the Foundational Model of Anatomy
(FMA) [3] to refer to anatomical entities in humans, and
the MPO uses the Adult Mouse Anatomy Ontology (MA)
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[8]. These anatomy ontologies describe anatomical enti-
ties by using, among others, part-whole relations, i.e.,
they focus on the anatomical structure.
Although the phenotype ontologies describe both
structurally and functionally abnormal phenotypes, the
anatomy ontologies do not include an elaborate descrip-
tion of the anatomical functions. As a consequence,
although the classification of structural abnormalities in
the phenotype ontologies follows well-defined principles,
the classification of phenotypes of functionings is often
unprincipled and sometimes ambiguous. To address the
issue of representing functional phenotypes, we provide
an ontology design pattern [9] for functional abnormali-
ties. This design pattern is applicable in phenotype ontol-
ogies, especially in the MPO and HPO. W e discuss the
benefits of the application of the design pattern and relate
the design pattern to the composite names of the catego-
ries in the phenotype ontologies. Based on the category
names, we apply a pattern-based approach to extract a
skeleton for an ontology of anatomical functions from a
combination of the anatomy and phenotype ontologies
together with the Biological Process ontology of the Gene
Ontology (GO) [4].
Biological functions
There is an ongoing discussion in the philosophy of biol-
ogy and theoretical biology as to the exact nature of a bio-
logical function. While functions of artifacts come into
being due to the intentions of a designer, biological enti-
ties have evolved over time, and biological functions are
not dependent on intentions in the same way as artifacts
are.
Philosophical theories of biological functions range
from reductions to causality over social accounts of func-
tions to the denial of the existence of biological functions.
The first two are of major importance, i.e., the causal view
of biological functions and the social view of biological
functions. The major proponents of causal explanations
of functionality are Wright [10] and Millikan [11], while
the social view is defended by Searle [12].
Wright gives the following definition of function [10]:
Definition 1. "The function of X is Z" means
1. X is there because it does Z,
2. Z is a consequence (or result) of X's being there.
In the definition, X is a category of structures and Z is a
process category, and instances of X  are involved in
instances of Z. In its definition, Wright does not distin-
guish between functions and the processes which realize
the function. Furthermore, the definition assumes that an
entity has only one function. However, as discussed by
Wright [10], the definition can be restated for entities
having multiple functions by replacing "the function of X
is Z" with "a function of X is Z".
In the social view, functions are ascribed to brute facts
by a conscious observer [12]. A detailed analysis is pro-
vided by Hartmann [13] and is illustrated in Figure 1.
Hartmann distinguishs three elements to the ascription
of a function: the setting of a goal in the future, the plan-
ning of how to achieve the goal, resulting in a structure
that is capable of achieving the goal through causal
means. Figure 1 shows how some entity obtains a single
function, according to Hartmann [13]. For an entity to
have multiple functions, the same three steps are per-
formed, yet the goal and the initial situation may change.
Methods
Ontology of functions
We do not choose a particular definition of biological
function, and we do not add another definition to the lit-
erature. The method we present is compatible with most
major views of function.
An analysis of how to represent functions has been pro-
vided by the Ontology of Functions (OF) [14,15]. A func-
tion in the OF is described in terms of a requirement
situation type, a goal situation type and a processual role.
The requirement situation type serves as precondition for
any function realization, the goal situation type is the
p o s t c o n d i t i o n ,  a n d  t h e  p r o c e s s u a l  r o l e  [ 1 6 ]  i s  u s e d  t o
describe  how  a function bearer brings about the goal
from the requirements. One major advantage of the treat-
ment of functions in the OF is the explicit inclusion of
preconditions for the function realizations, which serve
to model the contexts in which a function can be realized.
Function realizations
Functions can be realized multiple times. Each realization
of a function is a process, and in each realization of a
function the function bearer achieves the goal of the
function, starting at a situation satisfying the precondi-
tions of the function.
Figure 1 Three steps for function ascription. The figure shows the 
three conditions for the ascription of a single function to an entity. First, 
the goal of the function is established in the future. Second, the means 
for achieving the goal are selected or created. Finally, the goal can be 
realized by causal means, i.e., without the need for accessing or antici-
pating future states of the world.Hoehndorf et al. Journal of Biomedical Semantics 2010, 1:4
http://www.jbiomedsem.com/content/1/1/4
Page 3 of 10
While a function is an entity that is similar to a prop-
erty in that it inheres in its bearer, a functioning is a pro-
cess that is a realization of a function. For example, while
the function of the heart "to pump blood" is a property
that the heart has in virtue of being a heart and in virtue
of the evolutionary history of hearts, a functioning is the
actual process of pumping blood which realizes the func-
tion of the heart [17]. In particular, the function of the
heart is "to pump blood" even when the heart is not func-
tioning. This could be the case during a heart transplanta-
tion or during a malfunctioning of the heart.
Furthermore, the function of the heart is "to pump
blood" even when the heart cannot realize this function.
Function realizations always require a disposition to real-
ize the function in the function bearer, while the function
itself can exist without such a disposition. For our present
work, we use the simple conditional analysis of disposi-
tions [18]: "something x  i s  d i s p o s e d  a t  t i m e  t  to give
response r to stimulus s, iff, if x were to undergo s at t, x
would r".
There are other possible causes for a heart to not func-
tion, e.g., an abnormality in the nervous system. This is
not a malfunctioning of the heart. We define a function
by its preconditions and postconditions. In the case that
the nervous system fails, a precondition of the heart's
function is not satisfied. If this precondition was satisfied,
the heart would in fact pump blood (assuming the heart
is functional).
Therefore, it is not the heart's being malfunctional but
rather a non-satisfied precondition that causes the heart
to not function. Within a wider context, i.e., the whole
body, this may appear to be a malfunctioning of the heart,
but the original cause was elsewhere - in the nervous sys-
tem. The heart is functional, the nervous system abnor-
m a l l y  f u n c t i o n i n g .  A  r e p a i r  o r  t r e a t m e n t  o f  s u c h  a
condition should treat the nervous system and not the
heart.
Abnormal functionings
Abnormal functionings are processes which are similar to
a functioning, but which are impaired in some way. We
distinguish between abnormal functionings and malfunc-
tionings: in the case of a malfunctioning, the function
bearer cannot cause the goal of its function although the
preconditions for a function realization are given. An
entity  e  has the property of being malfunctional  (with
respect to the function f), if e has a function f, but not a
disposition d to realize the function f . Functions and dis-
positions are disjoint categories (i.e., neither is a subcate-
gory of the other), yet they are related in a particular way
[19]. While abnormal functionings are processes, being
malfunctional is a property of the function bearer; in the
case of a malfunctional entity, no process of functioning
can occur.
There are various kinds of abnormal functionings:
functionings may be more or less effective, have
unwanted side-effects or similar. We focus on the mal-
functional  property here. A classification of kinds of
abnormal functionings is out of the scope of this paper
and will be subject to future work.
Function and Structure
There is an important relationship between function and
structure. Biological functions are usually realized
through causal processes (cf. [13] and Figure 1) and the
function bearer has developed through evolution to play
a particular role in processes of a certain kind (e.g., the
role of the heart as a pump in its function to pump blood).
Therefore, if the heart - the function bearer - becomes
unable to play this role in the function realization, while
everything else remains unchanged, this loss of disposi-
tion is due to a change in the heart's structure. In general,
the loss of a disposition in the case of malfunctional enti-
ties must go along with a change in the structure of the
bearer of the disposition and function.
As a result, if e has a biological function f, and e is mal-
functional with respect to f, then e is abnormal. This pat-
tern is already implied in the taxonomic backbones of the
phenotype ontologies and reflected in the naming and
the definitions of the phenotype ontologies' categories.
The functional abnormality pattern
The functional abnormality pattern is an ontology design
pattern [9] for ontologies that classify both abnormal
structural and functional phenotypes, such as both the
Human and Mammalian Phenotype Ontology.
According to the functional abnormality pattern, an
abnormality of functioning (a property of a process)
implies an abnormality of the function bearer (provided
that external circumstances are normal). If multiple types
of entities have the same kind of function, then an abnor-
mality of the functioning implies  a disjunction of the
abnormalities of each possible kind of function bearer.
On the other hand, being malfunctional (a property of
the function bearer) is a sub-category of (is-a) an abnor-
mality of the function bearer, and if multiple types of enti-
ties have the same function, then being malfunctional is a
sub-category of a disjunction of the abnormalities of each
possible kind of function bearer.
For example, an abnormality in HearingP processes (we
use HearingF to refer to the function, and HearingP to
refer to the process realizing the function; HearingP pro-
cesses are functionings of the HearingF function) implies
an abnormality of the ears, if the function of the ears is
HearingF (and only the ears have the function HearingF).
If the function of both the left ear and the right ear was
HearingF, then an abnormality of HearingP  implies an
abnormality of the left ear or an abnormality of the rightHoehndorf et al. Journal of Biomedical Semantics 2010, 1:4
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ear. In this case, the category "abnormality of the left ear
or abnormality of the right ear" should be named "ear
abnormality" and defined as a disjunction of the two cate-
gories "abnormality of the left ear" and "abnormality of
the right ear", which are both sub-categories of "ear
abnormality".
On the other hand, the ears' being malfunctional with
respect to their HearingF function is a property of the
ears, and should be classified as a sub-category of Ear
abnormality. The ears' being malfunctional is defined as
the absence of a disposition which would normally be
present (due to the ears' having a function whose realiza-
tion requires the disposition), and the loss of a disposition
entails a structural modification according to the theory
of dispositions [18]. Therefore, a loss of a disposition is a
special kind of structural change of the disposition's
bearer.
Naming patterns in the phenotype ontologies
Our goal is to represent functional phenotypes formally.
While there is no ontology of anatomical functions yet,
such an anatomical function ontology is implied in the
phenotype ontologies. These ontologies classify abnor-
mal phenotypes, and in these phenotype ontologies,
abnormal functionings are usually classified as a sub-cat-
egory of abnormal structures which bear the function
that is impaired. Therefore, the phenotype ontologies can
serve as a seed for the construction of an ontology of ana-
tomical functions.
However, as the phenotype ontologies rarely define
abnormal functionings formally, the challenge is to
extract the information about anatomical structures and
their functions from the current ontology structure, cate-
gory names and definitions of the phenotype ontologies.
Such an approach will be insufficient to create an exhaus-
tive ontology of anatomical functions, because only few
functions are addressed in the phenotype ontologies, nor
will this approach provide a high-quality ontology that is
suitable for use in applications. Instead, our goal is to
extract functions that can be used as the backbone of an
ontology of formally defined function categories after a
manual review process.
The second major challenge in the extraction of ana-
tomical functions is to provide an analysis and formal
representation of the relations between anatomical func-
tions, their bearers and the processes that realize the
functions.
Formal representation of anatomical functions
In our formal analysis, we use the definition of the cate-
gory Deafness in both the Mammalian and Human Phe-
n o t ype  O n t o l o gy  as  a n  e x a m p l e .  T h e  d e f i n i t i o n  i n  t h e
cross-products of both ontologies is the following state-
ment in the OBO Flatfile Format [20]:
In the OBO Flatfile Format, the definition of an onto-
logical category is started with a [Term] statement, fol-
lowed by a unique identifier of the category. Everything
following an exclamation mark is considered to be a com-
ment.
The GO category GO:0007605 is named "sensory
perception of sound" and has a synonym "hearing". The
definition of Deafness in the two phenotype ontologies
we use in our analysis claims that Deafness is a process of
HearingP in which the quality Absent inheres. Inherence
is a dependence relation between an instance of a quality
and the bearer of the quality [21].
There are several problems with the analysis of Deaf-
ness  in the phenotype ontologies. The first problem is
that, according to the definition, Deafness is a process of
HearingP. Deafness seems to be something different from
a process, and certainly different from a HearingP pro-
cess. An absence of hearing means that there is no Hear-
ingP process what ever properties such a process might
have. In particular, Absent cannot inhere in a non-existing
process and is arguably not a quality at all.
The second problem is that there can be an absence of
hearing without there being a case of Deafness. In a com-
pletely silent environment, both a human or a mouse will
experience an absence of HearingP even when their dis-
position to hear is present. More precicely, according to
the definition of Deafness, an absence of sound would
also entail Deafness.
Therefore, to represent the phenotype Deafness  for-
mally, we are faced with two challenges: there is an
absence of HearingP  processes and there is also an
absence of the disposition to hear.
Using our ontological framework for representing mal-
functionality, we can represent Deafness as the ears' being
malfunctional  with respect to their HearingF  function.
However, a vital point is missing to apply our framework:
an ontology of anatomical functions. The absence of such
an ontology is one reason for the phenotype ontologies to
model abnormal functionings by using processes from
the GO.
While the anatomical functions are not yet covered in
an ontology, the processes that realize the anatomical
functions are present in GO's Biological Process ontol-
ogy. Therefore, we define a new relation that we call the
CC-has-function-realized-by (hf rb) relation. This rela-
tion is based on the relations CC-has-function and CC-
realized-by. The prefix CC  indicates that the relation
takes two ontological categories as arguments. The rela-Hoehndorf et al. Journal of Biomedical Semantics 2010, 1:4
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tions between categories are defined using relations
between individuals (II-relations), following the pattern
of defining CC-relations from the OBO Relationship
Ontology [5]. The definition of the relation CC-has-func-
tion is given in formula 1, where E denotes a category of
Presentials (in GFO [21]), Continuants (in BFO [22]) or
Endurants (in DOLCE [23]):
According to this definition, the category E  has the
function (CC-relation) F if and only if for every instance x
of E there is an instance y of F such that x has the function
(II-relation) y.
While the relation CC-has-function follows the stan-
dard pattern for defining relations between categories
[20], the relation CC-realized-by cannot follow the same
pattern. Applying the same pattern would require that,
for every function, there is a process that realized the
function. Yet, not every function instance is realized, and,
according to our considerations about malfunctionality,
not every function can be realized. Therefore, we have to
employ a different definition for the CC-realized-by rela-
tion given in formula 2. In the formulation of the defini-
tion of the CC-realized-by relation, we assume that
functions are not necessarily realized, but when they are
realized, then always by processes of a certain kind.
We recognize that this claim is controversial. There
may be functions that can be realized by different kinds of
processes. However, we assume that it is possible to find a
super-category for these kinds of processes that include
all and only those process categories that can realize the
function. For example, a TransportF function will always
be realized by TransportP  processes (yet, arguably, not
every TransportP process is a realization of a TransportF
function), and these TransportP processes can be of many
different kinds, all of which are sub-categories of the
TransportP process category.
According to this definition, the function category F is
realized by (CC-relation) the process category P if and
only if whenever an instance x of F is realized by some y,
then y is an instance of P .
With these definitions of the two relations CC-has-
function and CC-realized-by, we can give a definition for
the relation CC-has-function-realized-by:
This relation is a connection of the two previously
defined relations with an implicit function as argument.
The relation CC-has-function-realized-by holds between
the category E and the category P if and only if E has the
function F and F is realized by P .
The relation CC-has-function-realized-by is a relation
between two categories. The relation can be defined in
OWL2 as a connection between the two CC-relations by
using a property chain:
Such a definition can be used in an OWL ontology in
which ontological categories are in the domain of dis-
course (cf. [21,24,25]), i.e., in which there are OWL
classes which have ontological categories as their
instances.
A similar connection between the two relations II-has-
function and II-realized-by is very different from the rela-
tion between the categories: it is a relation between an
entity with a function that is in fact (and currently) real-
ized by a process:
Application to anatomy and phenotype ontologies
We apply the framework for representing functional
abnormalities to the automated extraction of anatomical
functions from the HPO and MPO. For this purpose, we
exploit the naming of the categories in the phenotype
ontologies.
W e  m a k e  u s e  o f  t h r e e  t y p e s  o f  o n t o l o g i e s  i n  o u r
approach:
1. the phenotype ontology that contains abnormal
functional phenotypes, either the HPO or the MPO,
2. an anatomy ontology that contains the structures
affected by the malfunctionings represented in the
phenotype ontology, either the Adult Mouse Anat-
omy Ontology [5] or the Foundational Model of Anat-
omy [3], and
3. a process ontology, which contains the processes
that realize an anatomical function.
Since functional abnormalities are already classified as
subclasses of structural abnormalities in the phenotype
ontologies that we consider, we search for a pattern in the
phenotype ontologies where
CC-has-function
II-has-function
(,) ( (,)
(
E F x instanceOf x E
y
⇔∀ →
∃ ( ( , ) ( , ))) x y instanceOf y F ∧
(1)
CC-realized-by
II-realized-by
(,) ,( (,)
(,
F P x y instanceOf x F
x
⇔∀ ∧
y y instanceceOf y P )( , ) ) →
(2)
CC-hfrb CC-hasfunction
CC-realizedBy
(,) ( (,)
(,) )
EP F EF
FP
⇔∃ ∧
(3)
CC-hfrb CC-has-function CC-realized-by =  (4)
II-hfrb II-hasFunction
II-realizedBy
(,) ( (,)
(,) )
ep z ez
zp
⇔∃ ∧
(5)Hoehndorf et al. Journal of Biomedical Semantics 2010, 1:4
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1. a category C in the phenotype ontology has a name
name(C); e.g., Hearing abnormality (HP:0000364),
2. in name(C), the name or synonym name(D) of a
GO Biological Process category D occurs as a sub-
string and name(D) is delimited by whitespaces in
name(C); e.g., Hearing (GO:0007605),
3. the category C is a sub-category of a category E
with a name name(E); e.g., Abnormality of the ears
(HP:0000598),
4. the name name(E) contains the name or synonym
name(F) of a category F from the anatomy ontology
and name(F) is delimited by whitespaces in name(E);
e.g., Ear (FMA:52780).
As a consequence, we find abnormalities of GO pro-
cesses that are classified as sub-categories of abnormali-
ties of anatomical structures in the phenotype ontologies.
To exclude categories that are named after diseases or
do not describe abnormalities, we only consider the cate-
gories of the phenotype ontologies which contain "abnor-
mal", "impaired", "decreased" or "increased" in their name
or synonyms and exclude the rest from our analysis. Fur-
thermore, we excluded the GO categories GO:0032502
(developmental process), GO:0043473 (pigmentation)
and GO:0001503 (ossification) from our analysis (see
Discussion section).
Figure 2 shows an overview of our extraction pipeline.
To match the names of the categories, we stemmed all
category labels and synonyms in the input ontologies by
using the PlingStemmer [26]. The PlingStemmer gener-
ates the singular forms of English words. Furthermore, all
category labels were reduced to their lower case form
before the matching was carried out.
Results
Using the HPO and the FMA, we could extract 25 struc-
ture-process pairs. These pairs and their evaluation are
available at our project page. Using the MPO and the MA
ontologies, we extracted 331 structure-process pairs. A
selection of the pairs which we extracted and which do
stand in the CC-has-function-realized-by  relation is
shown in Table 1. In Table 2 we show pairs that do not
stand in the CC-has-function-realized-by  relation. A
manual evaluation of our results with respect to the phe-
notype ontologies showed that we reach a precision of
75% for the HPO and FMA and a precision of 77.27% for
the MPO and MA.
However, these precision values are only valid within
the context of the reference ontologies. For example, the
CC-has-function-realized-by  relation holds between
Ear  (FMAID:52780) and Hearing  (GO:0007605)
according to the HPO, although ears only partially con-
tribute to Hearing. The quality of the extraction results
could be improved by ameliorating the background data
upon which the extraction is carried out.
Discussion
Functions of parts
Although we successfully applied our proposed ontology
pattern to harvest a basic ontology of anatomical func-
tions from the phenotype ontologies by using naming
patterns in the ontologies, there are cases in which our
pattern yields incorrect results. In particular, the relation
between functions and parts of structures remains a topic
for further research.
We have argued that an abnormality of a function
should be a sub-category of an abnormality of the bearer
of the function. However, there may be cases where the
Table 1: Selection of true positive matches
Structure Process
cardiovascular system anatomical structure 
morphogenesis
uterus angiogenesis
blood vessel cell migration
blood coagulation
female reproductive system diestrus
reproductive system fertilization
pancreas glucagon secretion
mammary gland lactation
The true positive matches were extracted using the Adult Mouse 
Anatomy Ontology and the Mammalian Phenotype Ontology.
Figure 2 Processing sequence of the input categories.Hoehndorf et al. Journal of Biomedical Semantics 2010, 1:4
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bearer of the function is not included in the anatomy
ontology or the abnormality of the function bearer is not
included in the phenotype ontology. Instead, a structure
of which the function bearer is a part or an abnormality
of such a structure is included. The functional abnormal-
ity pattern is valid if we assume that the abnormality of
the part is an abnormality of the whole. This assumption
is supported by the phenotype ontologies. Nevertheless,
to achieve completeness of both the anatomy ontologies
and the phenotype ontologies, and to provide a princi-
pled way for building the phenotype ontologies, it is ben-
eficial to include the abnormality of the function bearer
whenever an abnormality of a function is included in the
phenotype ontologies.
Text and naming problems
While processing the phenotype ontologies, we discov-
ered several naming problems. First, plural forms are
a ppa r e n t l y ra ndom l y m ix ed wit h s ingula r f orms  of  t he
same term. For example, the label of MP:0003677 is
"abnormal ear lobe", while the label of its subcategory
MP:0003678 is "absent ear lobes" (plural). The same
holds for HP:0000598 (abnormality of the ears) and
HP:0000370 (abnormality of the middle ear). We sug-
gest to use the plural form only in the case of explicitly
disjunctively defined categories. For example, a category
that is defined as the disjunction of the categories "abnor-
mality of the left ear" and "abnormality of the right ear"
may be called "abnormality of the ears".
Another difficulty is the mixture of structural and func-
tional abnormalities as category labels. For example, the
category  HP:0000251 is labeled "abnormality of tear
glands OR tear production". This name mixes structural
and functional abnormalities: tear glands are an anatomi-
cal structure, while tear production is a process that real-
i z e s  a  f u n c t i o n  ( t h e  f u n c t i o n  " t o  p r o d u c e  t e a r s " ) .  T o
improve the usability and the possibilities for automatic
processing of the phenotype ontologies, we suggest a sep-
aration of function and structure-based abnormalities.
For example, the category HP:0000251 should be split
into two distinct categories, one labelled "abnormality of
tear glands", the other "abnormality of tear production".
The third issue we found in the phenotype ontologies is
the inconsistent use of category labels. The MPO con-
tains the categories "abnormal hearing physiology"
(MP:0001963), "hearing disability" and "hearing impair-
ment" (exact synonyms for MP:0001965), "deafness"
(MP:0001967) and "impaired hearing" (MP:0006325).
The development of a naming convention would not only
serve automatic processing of the ontologies, but also
help to improve the clarity of the phenotype ontologies.
The current use of polysemous words is one of the
main drawback we face when trying to extract functions
out of the phenotype ontology. Ossification, for example,
can be understood both as the process of creating bone
tissue and as a property of a bone (the outcome of the
process). Thus, while bone ossification relates to the ossi-
fication process, skull ossification (HP:0002703) relates
to the state of the skull, i.e., the result of the ossification
process of the skull. Similarly, pigmentation  is used
widely as a property and not as the process of pigmenta-
tion.
Finally, a major problem for the phenotype ontologies is
the use of "absent" as a property. In English, "absent" is
used as an attributive adjective, and this is one reason
why "absent" is present in some ontologies of qualities, in
particular the phenotypic quality ontology PATO
(PATO:0000462). In most ontologies, such as DOLCE
[23], GFO [21] or BFO [22], qualities are dependent on a
bearer, an entity of which they are a quality. The meaning
of "absent", however, entails that there is no such bearer.
When "absent" is used in "absent appendix", "absent nip-
ple" or "absent hearing", it does not correspond to an
ontological quality [24]. While this fact is increasingly
being taken into consideration by the phenotype ontolo-
g i e s  i n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  c a t e g o r i e s  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  t h e
absence of structures, "absent" is still used as a quality in
the definition of categories of absent processes (or func-
tions). These categories should be carefully examined and
their definition made clear. They can be defined formally
by using the functional abnormality pattern [19], which
uses a form of the lacks relation [27] together with an
ontological analysis of functions and dispositions.
The problem of "absent" is not a problem of the pheno-
type ontologies alone. The PATO ontology also includes
"absent" as a quality, and it should be removed from the
PATO.
Ontology problems
Our analysis is hindered by the lack of categories or syn-
onyms for category names in GO's Biological Process
Ontology. For example, tear production, cardiac conduc-
Table 2: Selection of false positive matches extracted from 
mouse ontologies
Structure Process
blood morphogenesis of a 
branching structure
immune system t-cell apoptosis
trunk biological regulation
pancreas cell differentiation
blood vessel endothelial cell 
differentiation
Table 1: The false positive matches were extracted using the 
Adult Mouse Anatomy Ontology and the Mammalian Phenotype 
Ontology.Hoehndorf et al. Journal of Biomedical Semantics 2010, 1:4
http://www.jbiomedsem.com/content/1/1/4
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tion, hair pigmentation or taste sensation are not in the
GO, yet their existence is indicated by reference to these
processes in the phenotype ontologies. An extension of
the GO together with a consistent naming of the catego-
ries in the phenotype ontologies could improve our anal-
ysis and the clarity of the phenotype ontologies.
The need for an ontology of anatomical functions
One major problem in our analysis is the lack of an ana-
tomical functions ontology. The phenotype ontologies
imply that HearingF would be a function of the ears, by
stating that an abnormality in HearingF is a sub-category
of Abnormality of the ears. However, the ears can be nor-
mal and be functioning normally and still there may be an
absence of HearingP. In particular, Deafness may be the
result of an abnormality of the ears, or it may be the result
of an abnormality in the nervous system. For example, an
abnormality in the brain can impair HearingF just as well
as an abnormality in the ears can. The ears only partially
contribute to HearingP, and not every abnormality of
HearingF  is an abnormality of the ears. Therefore, the
ears and HearingP do not stand in the CC-has-function-
realized-by relation according to our definition: the ears
have some function which, if realized, is realized by pro-
cesses that may be part of HearingP processes, but are
not necessarily HearingP processes themselves, nor are
they always part of HearingP processes. Instead, the func-
tion of the ears is realized by processes of the kind Detec-
tion of mechanical stimulus involved in sensory perception
of sound (GO:0050910), which are a part-of Hearing in
the GO.
To prevent this kind of erroneous naming or definition
of categories, an explicit relation between anatomical
structures and their functions is needed, on which the
category definitions in the phenotype ontologies should
be based. Such an explicit relation between structures
and their functions can be achieved by the introduction
of an ontology of anatomical functions and the use of the
CC-has-function relation, or without the introduction of
an ontology of anatomical functions and the use of the
CC-has-function-realized-by relation.
One advantage of our introduction of the relation CC-
has-function-realized-by is that a needless duplication
of the processes in the GO is avoided. In particular, many
functions do not need to be named explicitly because the
processes in the GO are defined as processes that realize
a given function. A difficulty in hiding the function by
using the CC-has-function-realized-by relation occurs
when one kind of function can be realized by multiple
kinds of processes. In this case, a new super-category for
all the kinds of processes that may realize the function
must be introduced and used as the argument in the CC-
has-function-realized-by  relation. This new category
would be defined as the category of all processes that
realize a given function - a common form of defining pro-
cesses.
However, a separate ontology of anatomical functions
may provide benefits over indirectly relating structures
and processes by using CC-has-function-realized-by.
With the availability of an ontology of anatomical func-
tions, the inner structure of functions can be represented
[14], relations between functions themselves can be
established (such as functions that support or prevent
other functions [15]) and properties can be assigned to
functions.
Suggestions for future development of phenotype 
ontologies
Overall, our analysis of means for extracting and repre-
senting functions led to the discovery of several short-
comings of current ontologies. The following list
epitomizes these shortcomings and presents suggestions
for the future modelling of biomedical ontologies in gen-
eral and phenotype ontologies in particular.
• Naming conventions: plural and singular form seem
to be used inconsistenly in categories labels. For
example, MPO contains the categories labeled
"abnormal ear lobe" (MP:0003677) and "absent ear
lobes" (MP:0003678). We suggest to use the plural
form exclusively for naming categories defined dis-
junctively.
• Mixture of functional and structural abnormalities:
several categories are labeled with terms that denote a
mix of structural and functional abnormalities. An
example for such a mixture is the category label
"abnormality of tear glands OR tear production"
(HP:0000251). To provide a clear classification
founded in ontological principles and to enable auto-
matic processing, we suggest to split such classes into
distinct classes: Abnormality of tear glands and
Abnormality of tear production.
• Use of "Absent" as property: previous work has
pointed out that Absent is not an ontological property
(see e.g., [24,27]). We propose the use of a variant of
the lacks relation instead of Absent to improve the
clarity of the phenotype ontologies and to enable con-
sistent reasoning on them.
• Missing categories: Some categories implied in the
phenotype ontologies are absent in the GO. These
categories include Hair pigmentation and Taste sensa-
tion. Adding these categories to the GO would
improve the automatic extraction of cross-products
to link phenotype ontologies with the GO, and the use
of the CC-has-function-realized-by relation in the
anatomy ontologies provides a method to discover the
missing categories in the GO.
• Ambiguous category names: Some terms have been
used in literature to denote both processes and states.Hoehndorf et al. Journal of Biomedical Semantics 2010, 1:4
http://www.jbiomedsem.com/content/1/1/4
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An example for such a term is "ossification", which
can refer to the process of Ossification
(GO:0001503) or a property of a bone which is the
outcome of such a process. To ensure that terms in
the phenotype ontology are monosemous, we would
suggest the addition of more specific terms to class
labels. For example, we would suggest altering the
label "abnormal bone ossification" (MP:0008271)
into "abnormal bone ossification process" or "abnor-
mal bone ossification state" as required.
• Mapping of parts to functions of whole: Some of the
functions of anatomical structures implied by the
phenotype ontologies are mappings from a part of a
complex anatomical structure to the function realized
by the whole of the complex structure. For example,
Hearing abnormality (HP:0000364) being a sub-
class of Abnormality of the ears (HP:0000598)
implies that a function of the ears is realized by Hear-
ing processes. Rather, a function of the ears is realized
by a part of Hearing processes, namely by Detection of
mechanical stimulus involved in sensory perception of
sound (GO:0050910). The use of the CC-has-func-
tion-realized-by relation in the anatomy ontologies
can help to prevent these errors.
Conclusions
We present an ontology design pattern for the represen-
tation of functional abnormalities. The design pattern is
applicable to the Human Phenotype Ontology and the
Mammalian Phenotype Ontology. We show how to
model anatomical functions by using processes from the
Gene Ontology that may realize these functions. For this
purpose, we introduce a new relation between categories
of anatomical structures and process categories. This
relation states that an anatomical structure has some
function that is realized by a process of a certain kind.
Using this relation, functions can be specified without the
explicit introduction of an ontology of anatomical func-
tions.
We evaluated our method by exploiting the naming of
categories from the phenotype ontologies to extract
structure-process pairs that stand in the relation we
introduced. We extracted several structure-process pairs
from the Mammalian Phenotype Ontology together with
the Adult Mouse Anatomy Ontology, and from the
Human Phenotype Ontology together with the Founda-
tional Model of Anatomy.
In our analyis, we found several problems with the phe-
notype ontologies. In particular, we discovered ambigu-
ous namings of the categories and suggest the use of a
naming convention for the categories in the phenotype
ontologies. Additionally, we found a number of problem-
atic formal definitions of categories in the phenotype
ontologies. Most of these are categories of the malfunc-
tional type: the loss of the disposition to perform a cer-
tain function. The use of our ontological framework
would permit an improved ontological representation of
functional phenotypes and better capabilities for knowl-
edge extraction from the phenotype ontologies.
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